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Private equity in its purest sense is 
more a facilitator of management buy-
outs that result in a listed company 
being taken off a public stock exchange 
rather than an adder of value to the 
target company’s performance. 
 This is one of the key findings 
of research into the subject that I 
undertook alongside colleagues 
from Warwick Business School and 
the Econometric Institute, Erasmus 
University Rotterdam. A key corollary 
is that managers would much prefer 
to carry out such transactions without 
third-party involvement.
 The root of the motivation that 
drives management behaviour is to be 
found in the underlying reasons behind 
the decision to mount a management 
buy-out in the first place. 
 There are several principal 
reasons that can be readily identified 
in any given set of transactions (the 
transactions examined in this case 
included a series of deals enabled by 
private equity involvement in the UK 
between 1997 and 2003, featuring a 
wide range of companies in an equally 
wide range of industry sectors; they 
include United Biscuits, Pizza Express, 
Dewhurst, Fortnum & Mason, Anglian 
Group, Fitness First, Brake Brothers, 
and Osborne & Little, this last one 
being the family company of the current 
UK Chancellor of the Exchequer, 
George Osborne).
 One, the senior management 
might want to cancel a company’s 
public listing because they have lost 
the appetite for complying with the 
public reporting and governance 
requirements that are part and parcel 
of the listing. All other considerations 
aside, the reporting requirements 
increase the risk of losing control of 
proprietary information to competitors.
 Two, senior management might feel 
that a company is undervalued, which 
increases the risk of it being the subject 
of a hostile takeover, and the loss of 
senior management jobs.
 Three, the pressure of constant 
public and media scrutiny. Four, the 
absence of interest from industry 
analysts and the investing public, 
resulting in low liquidity. Taken together, 
these factors can combine to make it 
difficult, perhaps even impossible, for a 
company to take advantage of its public 
status, most notably issuing shares to 
finance growth, whether of the organic 
kind or by acquisition.
 Such considerations will almost 
always raise the possibility of private 
equity involvement in determining a 
company’s short-, medium- and long-
term future. Over the past 25 years, 
the sight of private equity firms joining 
forces with incumbent management to 
stage a buy-out has become a familiar 
element on the commercial landscape.
 In certain cases, management 
might be able to mobilise enough 
bank finance to complete a purchase 
on their own. This might arise in 
situations where a company is seen 
to be undervalued, and has ample 
cash reserves on its balance sheet 
that could be deployed to finance 
a buy-out; the ability to keep total 
control of a company, and so derive 
maximum benefit from any post-buy-
out improvement, would certainly 
increase the attractions of taking this 
route to ownership. 
 More commonly, however, the 
help of one or more private equity 
investors will be needed to enable a 
deal to proceed, not least because of 
their ability to arrange the necessary 
additional external financing. There 
exists a very simple equation: the larger 
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a company is, the less likely it is that 
its managers will possess the sums of 
money required to take it private.
 In the research, we focused on deals 
in which managers remained in their 
positions after going private to ensure 
that they are active decision makers 
in the going private process. We use 
two complementary approaches to 
investigate private equity participation 
in these going private transactions. 
 The first part of our analysis 
explores which firm characteristics 
are associated with managers 
seeking private equity backing as an 
alternative to conducting the deal on 
their own without outside equity capital 
and assistance. 
 Thus, we compare pure 
management buyouts (MBOs) 
and private equity-backed (PE-
backed) deals to a control group of 
firms that remained publicly listed. 
Such analysis provides important 
insights into managers’ choice of 
the particular route to take their firm 
private but assumes passive private 
equity investors. 
 The second part of our analysis 
addresses this assumption and 
compares the post-deal performance 
of MBOs versus PE-backed deals. 
This enables us to determine whether 
private equity investors add extra value 
in performance improvements post-
deal or are simply good in the cherry 
picking of targets that are expected to 
perform well.
 My own thinking today reflects 
the observations made as part of the 
research process. Companies that 
were the subject of MBOs without PE 
involvement, tended not to outperform 
their peer group before delisting, but 
did so afterwards. This is what I would 
expect of a company whose senior 
managers will now benefit directly from 
being owners of their company, rather 
than hired hands. 
 The PE-backed companies placed 
under the microscope, by contrast, 
were already outperforming their peer 
group. This would suggest to me that 
the private equity investors involved 
inclined towards cherry-picking. In 
short, pure private equity investors 
bringing nothing more to the table than 
finance were only seriously interested 
in those companies that were already 
doing well. 
 This is an important consideration 
that senior management teams 
considering mounting a buy-out 
should factor into their thinking when 
deciding just how to structure their 
planned transaction. Should they 
involve private equity backers, knowing 
that they might well prove to be mere 
deal facilitators rather than post-deal 
value-adders? Or might they somehow 
manage on their own, and keep all the 
gains for themselves?  
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